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CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA AND SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY IN CANADA
Angela W. Djao
Department of Sociology
University of Saskatchewan
ABSTRACT
The Canadian Constitution is usually interpreted as giving the provinces
primary jurisdiction over social welfare. However, the federal government utilizing
other powers provided in the constitution has expanded its role in legitimating the
social order by promoting social integration and providing the disadvantaged groups
with minimum social security. Thus social welfare is administered by both levels of
government. Yet the fact that no mandatory obligations are imposed on either level
of government has led to the development of social welfare policy in Canada in a
fashion that resembles a crazy patchwork quilt. This is shown in a review of the
post-World War II federal-provincial relations in both income security programs, and
personal and community social services.
The review also reveals the present situation as one of unresolved
contradictions of split responsibilities. The provinces by and large attempt to
restrict the federal role in social welfare to that of cost-sharing with minimum
policy input. The federal government, on the other hand, is attempting to reduce
its money transfers to the provinces and escape from financial responsibility for
many programs.
Finally, an examination of the new Constitution reveals the lack of guarantee
of social and economic rights for Canadians. The virtual silence over social
policies in the recent constitutional debate is not only lamentable but will
eventually prove detrimental to the development of Canada as a nation.
INTRODUCTION: BASIC CONTRADICTIONS
The official goal of any welfare state is egalitarianism or at least a
reduction in social inequality. Wilensky (1975), after examining the social welfare
progrars of 22 countries, concludes that the net short-term economic effect of the
welfare state is egalitarian, while he holds off speculations about the non-economic
or the long-term effects. Yet it is a well-known fact that in the last 30 years the
distribution of money income in Canada has not changed significantly (Gillespie,
1976; Caskie, 1979; Ross, 1980). The share of the lowest quintile of income earners
has remained about 4% while that of the highest quintile around 42%.
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Studies into the nature, role and processes of the welfare state, both in North
America and Western Europe, have revealed serious dilemmas in the welfare state such
that the expresf goal of social equality is thwarted. The basic contradiction in
social welfare is "between the protective, standard-raising, life-enhancing
functions of social security and its role in disciplining the labour force, more
specifically as a mechanism for compelling people to adapt to low or intermittent
wages" (Guest, 1980: 168), and generally to a social position of dependency and
subordination (see Piven & Cloward, 1971; Canadian Civil Liberties Association
1975; Galper, 1975; Mayo, 1975; Loney, 1977). The overall consequence for the
welfare beneficiaries is one of social control.
A second and related dilemma is that while the poor have benefitted from the
payouts of social welfare programs, so have the high-income and advantaged groups.
In fact the rich are likely to benefit more as they tend to have greater utilization
of such in-kind government transfers as education and health services (Badgley &
Charles, 1978). Moreover, the financing of social insurance programs (i.e.
unemployment insurance, Canada/Quebec Pension Plan and health insurance) is
regres.ive. This is not to mention the "fiscal" welfare system and the
"occupational" welfare system which are predominantly enjoyed by the high-income
groups and which are typically not perceived or treated as part of social security.
The purpose of this paper is not to elaborate on all the diverse manifestations
and consequences of these dilemmas in the Canadian welfare state. Rather, the focus
is on the constitutional dilemma in social welfare policy which compounds the
difficulties in reducing social inequality in Canada.
THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT
The British North America Act, the Constitution by which Canada was founded as
a nation-state in 1867, was interpreted as giving the provinces primary jurisdiction
over social welfare. According to Section 92 of the Act, the legislature in each
province could exclusively make laws in relation to such matters as
- public reformatory (subsection 6)
- hospitals, asylums, charities and ellemosynary institutions (subsection 7);
- municipal institutions in the province (subsection 8);
- property and civil rights (subsection 13);
- matters of a local and private nature (subsection 16).
Insofar as the federal government has more revenue at its disposal than the
provincial governments, it has from time to time sought to expand its role in
legitimating the social order by promoting social justice and integration, and by
providing the disadvantaged groups with minimum social security (Stevenson, 1977).
Through the adoption of two constitutional amendments, the federal government has
increased its powers in the area of social welfare policy. The amendment in 1940
gave the Parliament of Canada exclusive legislative authority in unemployment
insurance (Section 91 (2A) of the B.N.A. Act), and the 1951 amendment gave it
authority to make laws in relation to old age pensions and supplementary benefits,
including survivor's and disability benefits (Section 94A).
The federal government has not hesitated to make use of other powers provided
in the constitution either. Thus in 1945, it introduced Family Allowances without
constitutional amendment, on the ground that it had the right to make payments
directly to individuals. Moreover, it has bstablished extensive employment-related
services on the basis of its powers over the economy and the unemployment insurance;
welfare services for veterans on the basis of its responsibility for the military
service and the militia; social welfare for Native Peoples because of its
responsibility for the well-being of these peoples; and services to immigrants and
"citizenship" services because of its responsibility to aliens and naturalization
(Armitage, 1975: 61). Finally, the federal government has relied on conditional
grants to the provinces to extend its influence in social policies. Medicare,
public housing, higher education and Canada Assistance Plan are the most important
examples of past or ongoing conditional grants.
Thus we see that power for social welfare is divided between the two levels of
government: federal and provincial. The virtual impossibility of matching division
of sources of revenue with the division of government powers has led to serious
constitutional controversies (Birch, 1955). But it would be well to recall also
another observation made by Elizabeth Wallace in 1950:
The Act did not impose any obligations to provide welfare
services upon either the Dominion or the provinces, but simply
allocated, with less precision than its framers had hoped to
achieve, the various spheres of jurisdiction, any subsequent
action being permissive, not mandatory (Wallace, 1950: 3
emphasis added).
The fact that no mandatory obligations were imposed on either level of government
has led to the development of social welfare policy in Canada in a fashion that
resembles a crazy patchwork quilt. Consequently the rights and needs of Canadians
are compromised while "the federal government (wavers) between leading the nation
and bargaining piecemeal with the provinces" (Bell & Tepperman, 1979: 181).
POST-WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENT
The post-World War II development of income security programs and social
services must be seen within the context of federal-provincial relations because the
Canadian state actually comprises eleven governments: one federal and ten
provincial. The total Canadian social welfare institution can best be viewed as an
outcome of a peculiar federal system with a weak and unpopular central government.
The years between 1945 and 1962 are known as the era of "joint federalism" during
with the federal government and provincial governments, utilizing the conditional
cost-sharing program device, jointly established no fewer than 56 programs (Guest,
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1980). Particularly in the area of income security, the federal governments
attempts at greater political centralization led to the creation of direct cash
transfer payments from the federal government to individual Canadians (Banting,
1982). This move towards greater federal involvement and, in fact, leadership in
social welfare was not simply due to the financial inability of the provinces to
meet ircreasing demands. The main reasons that the federal government assumed more
powers in social welfare, while acknowledging provincial paramountcy in the area,
were:
1. Only the central government could effect a national income redistribution.
2. The federal government wishes to be seen by citizens as conferring tangible
cash benefits such as Family Allowances and Old Age Security.
3. Only the federal government could ensure some common standard such that there
would be a measure of equity in social security provision from province to
province.
4. The welfare programs must be portable so as not to impede the movement of
Canadians across the country.
5. The federal government saw in the exercise of welfare powers the opportunity of
stabilizing the economy by affecting Canadians' total demand for goods and
services (Armitage, 1975).
The last consideration, that is, federal influence in national economic policy,
was especially important in the expeansion of public assistance. According to
Drover and Gartner (1980), the developments during the fifties and sixties of
growing domination of the Canadian economy by the foreign-based multinational
corporations, the creation of a branch-plant economy and the preponderant reliance
on the resource sector relative to the manufacturing sector, combined to weaken the
power and control of the federal government over economic decisions. As the federal
government lost its grip over the economy, it turned steadily to the legitimation
function of introducing social welfare programs to promote social harmony and of
assuring an acceptable standard of living to the poor. This legitimation function
was all the more urgent in the face of mounting militancy among Quebec nationalists
that threatened the country's unity itself. The legitimation function was carried
out in the name of the war on poverty (Thatcher, 1982).
Meanwhile, since the end of WW I1, there was rapid development of the economies
of the larger provinces, especially in the resource industries which are under
provincial jurisdiction. This not only brought more revenues from resource
royalties to the provinces but led to the expansion of provincial government
institutions and structures as demands for their services increased. Provincial
government spending likewise increased, from 6.4% of the Gross National product in
1955 to 16% in 1974. While sizeable amounts of the increase were due to health and
welfare expenditures, most of the additional costs were related to the development
of the physical infrastructure and education as required by economic growth.
Increasing provincial spending spawned frictions between the provinces and Ottawa,
with increasing pressures from the larger provinces for fiscal decentralization and
more "tax points" (Stevenson, 1977).
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By means of conditional transfers the federal government was able to persuade
the provinces to institute medicare and various social programs. However, the
federal government's participation in policy decisions on social welfare was seen as
an invasion of provincial jurisdiction. The provinces opposed the federal
intervention for a number of reasons. People in different regions had different
needs and the provincial government was in the best position to assess these needs
and make provisions for them. Moreover, different provinces had set precedents
introducing new programs, for example, medicare and the Family Income Plan in
Saskatchewan; they did not have to wait for the federal initiative. The provinces
also argued that divided jurisdiction over social welfare only added to the
questions of responsibility and accountability. Finally, a high profile of the
federal government in social welfare would necessarily mean more transfers from the
richer provinces to the poorer ones. This was not always looked upon favourably by
the richer provinces of Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta (Armitage, 1975).
Between 1967 and 1977 there was a series of federal-provincial negotiations
over revenue collection, financial contributions and distribution of monies and
services. The issues have by no means been resolved, but the entire question of
welfare policy has receded from the limelight in federal-provincial relations,
pre-empted by the question of constitutional division of power over natural
resources and severe economic problems in the early 1980's. There was, however,
agreement on the Established Programs Financing (EPF) arrangement for funding of
health and post-secondary education programs by the end of the Seventies. Those
programs would no longer be cost-shared. The federal government gave up a share of
the income tax to the provinces, thus allowing the provinces a free hand in the
operation of the program.
In the area of income security and other social services, no clear-cut
resolution was attained, as will be seen in the following two sections.
I. Income Security Programs
The Canada Assistance Plan of 1966 (CAP) consolidated previous
federal-provincial, shared-cost programs including unemployment assistance, old age
assistance, blind and disabled persons assistance, child welfare and administrative
costs. Through the Plan, the federal government entered into agreements with the
provinces to reimburse 50% of the costs incurred in provincial or municipal
assistance to the needy. There would be no upper limit on the federal contribution
provided that (a) there would be a needs-test; (b) residence would not be a
condition of benefit, and (c) there would be a procedure for appeals by recipients
against administrative decisions (Armitage, 1975; Djao, 1979; Guest, 1980).
The administration of social assistance is left to the provinces, sometimes in
cooperation with the municipalities. The Canada Assistance Plan contains two
important features. First, assistance is not only intended to assist persons in
need but also those who are likely to be in need. The latter category is
interpreted to include individuals and families of the wage-earning poor who could
be given public assistance to supplement their income from employment. However, in
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practice assistance to the wage-earning poor has been insignificant. Second, the
Plan provides services to help people, mainly social assistance recipients, find and
maintain employment. The services include training, counselling, homemaker and
child care services.
The rates of assistance and criteria for eligibility are set by each province.
The differences among the provinces are determined not so much by differential
living costs as by differential ability or willingness to spend on the poor
(Armitage, 1975). Thus, the definition of a recipient's needs and the way these
needs are met are somewhat arbitrary. The rates established by all the provinces
are below the poverty line, whether one uses the poverty line provided by Statistics
Canada or the Canadian Council on Social Development or the Special Senate Committee
on Poverty. Nevertheless, from 1960 to 1975 the growth of public assistance in
Canada was phenomenal: the number of persons assisted increased by 278% while
expenditures on constant dollars increased by 840% (compared to 254% and 246% in the
U.S. respectively) (Drover & Gartner, 1980).
Critics point out that as the Plan stands now it is ineffectual in combating
poverty. The Special Senate Committee on Poverty recommended the guaranteed annual
income (GAI) approach instead.
In 1970, John Munro, the minister of National Health and Welfare published
Income Security for Canadians. According to this White Paper, while demogrants (ie:
universal programs), social insurance and social assistance were to be retained as
instruments of income security policy, the main thrust of the government's proposed
policy for the coming years was "developing the guaranteed income technique as a
major anti-poverty policy" (Canada Health & Welfare, 1970: 2).
The guaranteed annual income is not a special method of income security.
Rather it represents a social goal. In public discussion so far, the basic
components of GAI include an income support program to assist those not in the
labour force and an income supplement program to assist the wage-earning poor.
These programs would be administered according to demonstrated need and would have
built-in incentives to encourage the recipients to earn additional income. GAI
would cover many more of the wage-earning poor than presently covered by the CAP.
Assistance received in this way would be less stigmatizing, as a simpler income test
for eligibility can be integrated within the tax system. However, the differential
reduction rates in the two-tier program would reaffirm the "less eligibility"
principle, ie: "total financial rewards to those who work would always exceed
benefits to those who do not work" (Guest, 1980: 193).
T'-.ere was a great deal of interest in the GAI in the early seventies although
only Manitoba took up the federal offer of assuming 75% of the costs in launching a
GAI experiment. Meanwhile, in 1973, the new minister of National Health and
Welfare, Marc Lalonde, initiated a comprehensive social security review with his
Orange Paper, Working Paper on Social Security in Canada. The Mincome Manitoba
experiment staff worked closely with the Federal-Provincial Working Party on Income
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Maintenance which was one of the three major components of the social security
review. (The other two were, Working Parties on Employment, and Social and
Employment Services.)
In 1977, as a result of the social security review, the federal government
tried to persuade the provinces to accept some form of GAI. There was some urgency
on the part of the federal authorities in the light of the new constitutional crisis
posed by the election of the separatist party, Parti Quebecois, in 1976. However,
the interest in GAI had waned. The provinces, led by Ontario, opposed the scheme.
Inflationary pressures following the 1974 oil pricing crisis, increasing
unemployment, and a general economic downturn did not augur well for a new thrust in
income security endeavours. The GAI was shelved. However, the technical reports of
the Mincome Manitoba experiment published in 1979 provide valuable data on a number
of technical and policy questions, such as the integration of the GAI with the tax
system and the existing social insurance programs. Should some form of nation-wide
GAI be reconsidered at a later date to replace the stigma-conferring social
assistance plan, useful information and experience could be gleaned from the Mincome
Manitoba reports (Splane, 1980).
There were changes in other income security programs in the seventies. In
1974, the amount of Family Allowances was increased. While Ottawa continues to
provide all the funds for Family Allowances, the provinces could vary payments
according to the age and/or number of children in the family. This change was an
attempt at reaching some measure of jurisdictional harmony between the federal and
provincial goverments.
As a result of the social security review, the benefits of both Old Age
Security (OAS) and Old Age Security Guaranteed Income Supplement (OAS-GIS) were
increased and indexed to the consumer price index on a quarterly basis. On the
other hand, in the late 1970's, unemployment insurance regulations were tightened to
limit eligibility. Economic projects such as Opportunities for Youth and the
Company of Young Canadians were abolished, and the Local Initiatives Programs were
curtailed. These changes all took place in the income security field traditionally
handled exclusively by the federal government and were instituted as part of the
budgetary restraint policy. But this decreased responsibility for welfare programs
also took place at a time when the provinces were asserting their jurisdictional
rights and prerogatives with renewed vigour. As will be seen in the next section,
personal and community social services became an even greater casualty in government
cutbacks and increasing tensions in federal-provincial relations.
II. Personal and Community Social Services
Most of the personal and community social services established in the first
half of the century were operated by philanthropic organizations in the private,
voluntary sector. Until 1966, the provinces alone were responsible for
state-provided social services, except for vocational rehabilitation services for
the disabled for which there was federal cost-sharing since 1952 (Guest, 1980).
Through the cost-sharing arrangements agreed upon in the Canada Assistance Plan
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(1966), the federal government began to exert influence on the development of social
welfar,. services across the country. The broad objectives of the CAP social
services were "the lessening, removal or prevention of the causes and effects of
poverty, child neglect or dependence on public assistance" (quoted in Armitage,
1975: 149). Services include casework, counselling, homemaker and day care
services, and community development. It should be noted that preventive services
are part of the express purpose of the Plan, although in practice, access to
services is limited to those who are already deemed to be "in need", that is, social
assistance recipients. Thus, the social services provided by the provincial
departments of social welfare are labelled, and they, along with social assistance
payments, are stigma-conferring.
Although the provision for the federal government to pay 50% of the costs of
the welfare services has been instrumental or even decisive in establishing many
services badly needed in some communities, there has also been resentment by the
provinces that the priorities are often set by the central government without due
regard for the particular needs and conditions in the different regions.
By the early 1970's, inadequacy in both quality and quantity of publicly
provided social services became increasingly apparent (Canada Special Senate
Committee on Poverty, 1971; Quebec Commission of Inquiry on Health and Social
Welfare, 1971). The thinking on social services in Marc Lalonde's Orange Paper
(1973), however, did not indicate any significant departure from the orientation
already embodied in the CAP. The paper focused narrowly on those services related
to income security and the entry or re-entry of those on assistance into the labour
force. Job counselling, training, placement, rehabilitation, homemaker and child
care services were among the services emphasized. Despite the limited version of
the Orange Paper, new perspectives on social services were soon introduced by the
Federal-Provincial Working Party on Social and Employment Services. The Working
Party rejected the "case" approach in the provision of social services heretofore
relied upon by government social workers. Instead, members of the Working Party
argued for community development and social change goals for social services. Among
the recommendations were that eligibility for services should be separated from
financial assistance. "Certain public social services should be available to anyone
upon demand, without needs-testing or payment of fees ..., other services upon the
basis of diagnosed need ('case services'). User charges should applied to some
services ... " (Kelly, 1977). Citizen participation in planning and provision of
social services was also recommended.
As a result of the social security review and negotiations, the federal and
provincial ministers of welfare acknowledged in a communique, February 4, 1976, that
there is
a recognition of the importance of social services for ensuring
the opportunity for personal development of all Canadians and
preventing and alleviating the social and economic problems of
individuals and communities. It is intended that the new
legislation assist the provinces in responding to the changing
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social and personal needs of Canadians. To that end, the scope
of cost-sharing of a number of services will be extended and a
number of new services will become eligible for cost-sharing
(Canada Federal-Provincial Ministers of Welfare, 1976).
The Social Services Act (Bill C-57) introduced in the Commons in June, 1977
sought to meet this promise. Under Bill C-57, ome services would be cost shareable
when provided on the basis of identified need. User charges related to a person's
income would apply to certain services (such as day care, meals on wheels, and
counselling of all types). Other cost-shareable 3ervices would be made available
free upon demand, without any needs- or means-test.
Bll C-57 was intended to provide an impetus toward and a financial incentive
for developing a system of universal and less stigmatizing social services by the
provinces. It signified a strong federal commitment to the development of personal
and community social services. The provinces, on the other handl would waive resi-
dency as a criterion of eligibiliy and establish appeal boards independent of
provincial department of social services (Riches, 1977).
Despite the approval accorded to the proposed legislation by all the provinces
in prior negotiations, during the summer of 1977, there was opposition by Quebec and
two other provinces. The federal categorization scheme of certain services as
universal, limited access, or fee chargeable was perceived to be inflexible and to
indicate undue federal control of the services. Demanding more tax points to
finance and run its own programs, Quebec denounced the Bill as "an unwarranted
intrusion by the federal government into an area of exclusive provincial
jurisdiction" (National Council of Welfare, 1978).
In September, 1977, three months after Bill C-57 was introduced, Marc Lalonde
withdrew it from the Parliament. He announced that the income security programs
under the CAP would continue to operate on the current 50:50 cost-sharing arrange-
ment while social services were going to be financed by block funding. Part of the
block funding would be "basic cash contribution" (a lump sum grant of equal per
capita amounts to each province) and part a "levelling payment" (Boadway, 1980).
A new bill (C-55) proposing the block funding formula was given first reading
on 12 May 1978, but died on the order paper. So legislation is still at the stage
of the CAP 50:50 cost-sharing arrangement for both income maintenance programs and
social services. Nor have there been any remarkable changes in the kind of programs
offered.
The inability of the federal and provincial governments to devise a concerted
strategy for improving social services has serious consequences, not just for the
poor, but also for many other minority groups such as women, the Native Peoples, the
elderly, th% disabled, and the mentally retarded, regardless of socio-economic
backgrounds. All these categories of people share the experience of having to cope
with a bureaucracy that makes it difficult to discover which level of government
offers a given service or funding program.
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PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
The above review of federal-provincial disagreements on social welfare shows
that the present jurisdictional division of powers in this area, even with
amendments to the Constitution and periodic federal-provincial negotiations, have
not resolved the contradictions of split responsibilities. The conditional grant as
a method of financing social welfare has its supporters and opponents. However,
the question is more than just that of the best way of federal financing:
conditional grants, tax abatements or unconditional equalization payments. The
question is also more than just one of jursidiction. As has been noted, there was
very little discussion of income redistribution during the entire period of social
welfare review, although that problem was "central to the articulation of an
equitable social security plan" (Bergeron, 1979: 3). This silence over a very
crucial point in social welfare is all the more distressing if one recalls the
stated goal of the social security review by Marc Lalonde in his 1973 Working Paper.
Assuring the provinces some degree of flexibility in determining the levels of
income guarantees and supplementation within joint federal-provincial programs in
their own provinces, Lalonde states:
Inherent in this flexibility formula ... is the proposition
that the Parliament of Canada must continue to play a role in
the income security system: that it has a responsibility to
combat proverty by way of a fair distribution of income among
people across Canada; and that it has a responsibility to
promote national unity through preventing extremes in income
disparities across the country.
If social welfare including both income security programs and social services
is considered in the light of redistribution of income, commitments and obligations
are at issue. Obviously only the federal government can redistribute income on a
national scope, but there are also disparities within provinces for which redistri-
bution by the provincial government is needed. Thus, shared responsibility as a
principle should be recognized as such, the presence of the federal government in
social policy should be ensured, and the duties of the federal government in social
welfare, especially in the income security programs, should be more clearly stated.
Similarly, the acknowledgement of provincial paramountcy in the provision of social
welfare is not enough. Rather, obligations to provide social welfare should be
imposed on specific levels of the government, be it federal, provincial or even
municipal.
During those times when the federal government tried to expand its role in
social welfare policy, it used arguments such as strengthening national unity,
promoting national interest, or achieving some degree of uniformity in standards,
etc. Yet we have seen that during periods of economic slump, it has not hesitated
to back away from these goals or diminish its support for social equality in Canada
(Carrier, 1981: 8). On the other hand, the provincial governments have typically
argued that they are in the best position to judge local needs and hence provide the
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appropriate social services. On the basis of this argument, they have vehemently
opposed federal intervention in areas of provincial jurisdiction. However, there is
no convincing evidence that the provinces on their own have the will or reources to
provide a social services minimum paralleling the income security minimum. Perhaps
the case of Saskatchewan, where a social democratic government avowedly with a
social conscience was in power in the recent past for eleven years, 1971-1982, may
illustrate the point.
Saskatchewan's average annual growth rate of real spending on the Departments
of Health, Education and Social Services declined from 4.5 per cent from 1971-76 to
1.3 per cent for 1976-81 (Harding and Riches, 1982). Yet by 1977, 77 per cent of
the provincial spending on social services was going to institutional care (mostly
operated by commercial agencies), and 50 per cent was spent on "privatised" welfare
(that is, services provided by non-profit, commercial or voluntary agencies). This
pattern of spending left little -resource for initiating and developing preventive
services, or more generally, developing a comprehensive social welfare system aimed
at an equitable distribution of social and economic benefits from Saskatchewan's
growing wealth. The government was "primarily concerned with (natural) resources
such as oil, potash and uranium and with the capital requirements of two Crown
Corporations -- Saskpower and Sasktel" (Riches, 1980: 14). It would appear that in
ideology, policy orientation and practice in the area of social welfare,
Saskatchewan like other provinces was throwing back the responsibility for citizens'
welfare to the individual, the family, private organizations and the forces of the
marketplace.
This rather gloomy picture of social welfare policy development in Saskatchewan
shoulJ serve warning to the urgent need of a constitutional reform that will not
only delineate jurisdictional division of power but also impose duties on the
different levels of government to provide comprehensive social welfare to all
Canadians. Such a reform should ensure that the roles of the federal and provincial
governments be accepted and developed as creative and constructive forces (Riches,
1977) in envisioning, structuring and implementing a system of social security
needed in modern society.
CANADA'S NEW CONSTITUTION
Canada's new Constitution was formally proclaimed in April, 1982. However, it
does not resolve the dilemmas ensuing from split responsibilities between the
federal and provincial governments. Section 92 of the Constitution remains
unchanged. The most salient feature of the new Constitution is the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. But the Charter also falls short of expectations. Although it
is said in Part III of the Charter, Equalization and Regional Disparities, that
"Parliament and the Legislatures together with the government of Canada and the
provincial governments, are committed to ... promoting equal opportunities for the
well-being of C~nadians," there is no guarantee that every person has social and
economic rights.
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In speaking of rights, one could broadly distinguish between "civil and
political" rights on the one hand and "social and economic" rights on the other.
The rights of life, freedom of associationy freedom of belief and opinion, and
democratic rights belong to the first category. The rights to work, equality of
economic opportunity and social security fall into the second category (Watson,
1976). In many European countries it is generally accepted that rights of citizen-
ship include social and economic rights (Wolfe, 1980). It is recognized that the
nature of social rights is neither self-evident nor given. The content of social
rights, moreover, is relative to the prevailing standard of living in a particular
society at a particular time. However, in this regard, we can refer to the United
Nations Declaration of Human Rights, (Canada, incidentally, played a key role in
bring about its proclamation in 1948). The U.N. Universal Declaration includes
economic, social and cultural, as well as political and civil, rights. Article 25
(1) reads:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and his family, including
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services, and the right to security in the event of unemploy-
ment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control;
and Article 24 reads:
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reason-
able limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with
pay (United Nations, 1978, p. 1).
The U.N. Declaration not only recognizes that social services to meet human
needs are a human right, but also that economic rights include the right to an
adequate standard of living. One can argue that the latter could embrace the right
to a guaranteed income. In Canada we are in a good position today to venture into
this income security program. Not only do we have the technological capabilities
for the data processing and computation necessary for such a program, but
experiences gained in recent years have provided answers to some important
questions. The refundable child tax credit established in 1979 has demonstrated
that the personal income tax system can be integrated with the social welfare system
in the form of an equitable, non-stigmatizing income security program. The simple
income test employed in Guaranteed Income supplement to Old Age Security has also
been proven to be workable. Moreover, the Mincome Manitoba reports have provided
solutions to some technical problems in implementing GAl. Whether or not GAI will
become a reality in the 1980's will be "related more to political and constitutional
factors than to the availability of answers to technical problems of social
security" (Splane, 1980: 87).
Some of the wording in the U.N. Universal Declaration may be subject to
discussion and modification. Nevertheless, the general principles proclaimed are
sound guidelines for a constitutional framework that seeks to ensure the well-being
of citizens in a modern industrial society. Unfortunately such issues were not
considered in discussions leading to the adoption of the new Constitution.
To conclude, the prospects for social welfare in Canada at this point in
history are dim. The virtual silence over social policies in the recent
constitutional debate is lamentable and will eventually prove detrimental to the
development of Canada as a nation. One way of resolving the other dilemmas stated
at the beginning of the paper -- social development vs. social control and
differential welfare benefits to different social groups -- was to address the
constitutional dilemma regarding social welfare. It would not be enough simply to
allocate spheres of jurisdiction. Rather, only when obligations are imposed on each
level of government for various aspects of social security could citizen groups
articulate their demands for income redistribution and quality social services in a
directed and focused way.
NOTES
1. "Social welfare" and "social security" are used interchangeably in this paper.
Social welfare is conceputalized as the societal institution concerned with the
security and well-being of the individual and the family. It includes such
measures as "general income redistribution programmes, payments to persons in
need, social insurance schemes, welfare counselling and other services,
housing, hospital and medical care insurance, public health clinics, and other
preventive health measures, vocational training and rehabilitation, urban
redevelopment and the development of depressed regions and other programmes"
(Statistics Canada, 1978). The entire institution is made up of two broad
components: income security and social services. The latter in turn includes
three categories: preventive and public health services, curative health
services, and social welfare services. In this paper, in addition to income
security programmes, we are mainly concerned with social welfare services, and
not those services related to education, health, adult corrections, recreation
or housing.
2. The cost-shareable services based on needs-test include: "children's
protective, preventive and developmental services; home support services, such
as homemakers and meals on wheels; family and other types of counselling;
rehabilitation services for the disabled, whether or not employment enhancing"
(Kelly, 1978: 158).
3. The universal, free services include: information and referral, crisis
intervention, family planning, community-oriented preventive services (such as
family life and pre-natal education) and community development services.
4. By the early 1970's it became increasingly clear that all Canadians, and not
just the poor, had need for personal and community social services at some time
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in their lives. However, the poor would likely have greater reliance on
services provided by the state while the rich could purchase certain services
in the private sector.
5. It should be noted that the "social minimum" suggested in the Marsh Report
(1943) was essentially an income support minimum formed by an integration of
social insurance, family allowances and social assistance.
6. In this paper, I follow the definition of "rights" given by Baines (1980: 1):
A 'right' is any claim which is protected by law. The phrase
'human rights' will be used to designate those claims which
people make against the state by virture of their membership in
the state. There are other terms such as 'civil liberties' or
'fundamental freedoms and rights' which might be used
interchangeably with 'human rights'. Generally speaking, these
terms focus on the distinction between what a citizen is
entitled to do or not do and what a government can do or not
do. If the normal function of government is to make and
enforce rules; then a human, or citizen's, rights imposes
limitations on that rule-making ability. There is, never-
theless, a wide variety of expectations about what those
limitations should be.
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